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Recent scholarship on state-religion relations in China has highlighted the 
continuities between republican-era and PRC anti-superstition campaigns and state 
management of religion, as well as the creative adaptation of religious groups within an 
unfavourable regulatory environment. Negotiating religion is an excellent addition to this 
literature, using the case of Guangzhou fron the late 19th century to the 1930s.  
The first reform to affect the traditional religious ecology was the “convert 
temples to schools” movement, which began in 1898. It was the large Buddhist and 
Daoist monasteries that were the first targets of this campaign, rather than the more 
numerous territorial temples. An important reason was that territorial temples were 
owned and managed by entire local communities, represented by their local elites, rather 
than by small numbers of socially stigmatized monks and nuns. With the 1911 revolution, 
the entire religious structure of the Chinese state was abolished; the lunar calendar was 
replaced by the Gregorian calendar, and most popular worship, at least temporarily, 
ended. More temples were also confiscated, such as the Huang Daxian 黃大仙 (Wong 
Tai Sin) temple of Guangzhou which was converted first into a school for girls, then into 
an orphanage. From 1920 to 1928, there were no direct restrictions on traditional 
religious practices, but the state nonetheless heavily interfered in the ownership and 
management of temples. The motivation was primarily financial: starved for funds to 
build an expanding state and conduct its military campaigns, and in the context of a 
booming real estate market, the government saw the confiscation and sale of temples as a 
lucrative source of revenue. Some 570 temples were thus put on the market (p. 58) – 
although neighbourhood or religious communities were also allowed to “purchase” their 
own temple, so that some of the temples continued to operate even after they were 
“sold”. This policy, and other government infrastructure projects that were seen as 
damaging the landscape’s fengshui, triggered strong popular opposition and resistance, 
which was channelled by the Merchants’ Corps 商團, an armed organization of local 
merchant elites. This and other conflicts escalated into a military revolt in 1924, which 
was crushed by the government army.  
 With the reinforcement of KMT power, and especially after the Nanjing regime 
was established in 1927, the state adopted a more activist attitude towards popular 
religion – but it always had to deal with popular resistance and adaptation. It was difficult 
to enfore new regulations banning fortune telling: most of the diviners and geomancers 
were old, blind or handicapped, and practicing their trade was their only means of 
making a living and supporting their families. They were able to organize themselves and 
to use the new civic discourse on productive work to petition the government. They 
were even able to delay the government’s plan of converting the City God temple – 
which was fortune tellers’ main place of work – into a “Native Goods Exhibition Hall.” 
This project, which aimed to replace the symbol of the old superstitious order with a 
flagship of nationalist industrial production and consumption, was finally inaugurated in 
1930. However, while the people enjoyed the exhibits, they continued to worship in a 
small back chamber of the building, in which a statue of the god remained.    
 Such incongruous juxtapositions also occurred in ritual contexts. Chapter 4, on  
“refashioning rituals and festivals”, describes the result of attempts to modernize the 
“Double Seventh” 七夕 festival, which traditionally involved single women who made 
extravagant offerings to celebrate the love story of the Cowherd and the Weaving Maid, 
and pray for a good husband. The government tried to replace this custom with a secular 
commemoration of Leizu 嫘祖, the legendary inventor of silkworm raising and wife of 
the Yellow Emperor. Exhibitions on sericulture, official ceremonies and public 
entertainment were offered, in an attempt to celebrate Chinese nationalism and the role 
of women in economic production. The common people, however, saw no contradiction 
between the two festivals, and participated in both simultaneously. In the case of the 
ghost festival, also targeted by anti-superstition campaigns, a charitable hospital in 
Guangzhou circumvented the ban on the rites by holding them in the guise of a 
commemoration of Nationalist soldiers killed in battle. While state representatives 
officiated at one altar according to the solemn, secular form, the masses made their 
offerings to the hungry ghosts at another altar. 
 While chapters 1-4 discuss the implications of attemps to eradicate customs and 
rituals as superstition, chapter 5, on “government and the remaking of religion in the 
1930s,” explores the consequences of the government’s protection of those institutions 
which it considered to be legitimate “religion”. The government of warlord Chen Jitang 
陳濟棠  (1890-1954) sought to promote patriotic civilization by encouraging the 
commemoration of Confucius and Guan Yu 關羽, following rites similar to the official 
cults of late imperial China. However, this only offered a path for the legitimation of the 
popular worship of Guan Yu as the deity Guandi 關帝, which had little connection to 
nationalist ideology, and even to the renaming of popular temples to Guanyin and other 
“illegal” deities as “Confucius temples,” in order to protect them from confiscation. This 
chapter also reveals a shift in the fortunes of the large Buddhist and Daoist monasteries: 
while they had been the prime target of the earlier, post 1898 reforms, by the 1930s the 
few that remained benefited from their status as the embodiments of the new concept of 
‘religion’ as well as from the personal connections between monastic and military elites.  
Overall, Negotiating Religion is an indispensable local case study for understanding 
state/religion/society dynamics in Republican China. The book highlights the 
importance of regional variations, as Guangzhou was often under different political and 
warlord regimes than other parts of China. It also brings to light changes at different 
periods, as well as the conflicts between different government agencies, some of which 
(such as the Customs Reform Commission) zealously pursued anti-superstition 
campaigns, while others (notably the Public Security Bureau) opposed them. Meanwhile, 
the realm of “popular religion” is unpacked as being composed of a wide diversity of 
practices, groups, specialists, and temples, each of which had different interests and 
followed divergent strategies in adapting to political and social changes. What appears is 
not a struggle between monolithic entities and ideologies of the “state” and “religion”, 
with the latter hopelessly suppressed by the former, but creative reinventions, 
appropriations and juxtapositions. This raises the question of the continuities and 
ruptures with similar “superscriptions” and “ritual disguises” in both late imperial and 
contemporary China, a question which is briefly discussed in the conclusion. Another 
question which should be addressed in future studies, is the dimension of gender. Many 
of the rituals targeted by anti-superstition campaigns, such as the Double Seventh, were 
dominated by women, while some of the modern substitutes – such as the Leizu festival, 
or temples converted into girls’ schools, aimed to improve the status of women. How do 
the struggles over religion, superstition and modernity fit into changing constructions of 
gender in China? This would be a fascinating topic for future research.    
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